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INTRODUCTION 
This  conference provides  an  excellent opportunity to detail  the  reactions of 
a  European  to  transatlantic monetary  events of the  spring of  1981  and  to express 
the  concerns  that  may  be  felt  in the  Community  :  sharp fluctuations  in  the dollar 
disturb trade  between  the  Community  and  the  United  States,  may  affect  the price 
of oil  and  other  primary  commodities,  aggravate  tensions  within the  EMS,  and 
disrupt  the  coordination of exchange  and  intervention policies. 
Yet,  if we  were  to  focus  entirely on  today's  events,  we  would  not  do  justice 
to  the  complexity  and  to  the  depth  of our  monetary  relations. 
Indeed,  this  is not  the first time  that  Europeans  have  voiced their dislike 
of  American  monetary  stances.  Did  we  not  suffer  from  the dollar scarcity, 
from  United  States  investments  in  Europe  and  from  American  seignorage?  Later 
the  inflationary potential  of excess dollar  balances  left  some  of  us  aghast 
while others  welcomed  the  United  States dollars which  - at  long  last  - enabled 
-them  to  escape  the  balance of payments  financing  constraints.  How  often have  "substi-
tution  accounts"  been  discussed only  to be  replaced by  an  excessively strong dollar 
and  inflationary prices? 
THE  EMERGENCE  OF  A TRIPOLAR  WORLD 
Comments  of figures  Table  1  and  2  annexed. 
First,  while  the  United  States economic  weight  has  decreased,  its financial 
importance  does  not  seem  to  have  diminished  much.  On  the other  hand,  the 
economic  importance of the  Community  and  of  Japan  has  increased  ~onsiderably, 
but  this  has  not  been  paralleled  in  the  financial  and  monetary  field.  These 
developments  explain the difficulties encountered  in managing  world  macro-
economies  as  there  is  no  absolutely dominant  power  as  in  the fifties,  while 
the  United  States nevertheless still seem  to  hold  a  preponderant  position. 
Second,  world  economic  integration  has  continued  to  make  progress  and  has 
even  accelerated.  Cyclical  and  policy  interdependence is high. 
The  third conclusion  concerns  the gradually emerging  third  European  pole. 
This  pole is obviously  much  less  coherent  than  the other  two  : 
its foreign  trade  and  GDP  aggregates  reflect  to  some  extent  only statistical 
magnitudes.  However,  the  relative decline of the  United  States economic  power 
and  especially the  exchange  rate  regime  that  has  prevailed since 1973  has 
brought  about  a  degree  of  individualization of  the  Community  in the  field 
of  macro-economic  policy  that did  not  previously exist. 
The  evolution  which  led  to  the present  floating  regime  and  floating  itself 
have  "deprived"  individual  European  countries of the.organizing factor 
represented  by  the dollar.  After  a  long  period of  increasing divergences 
and  of  a  lack  of  any  form  of monetary  organization,  the  coordination of 
monetary  and  exchange  policies has  been  strengthened by  the  implementation 
of  the  European  Monetary  System  which  has  thus  resulted  in  an  increasingly 
more  orderly  joint  float  against  the dollar  and  the  yen.  This  tends  to 
individualize the  third pole without  it being  possible to determine  its 
________  nature  exactly_:  for_ example  whether__it  could_ be_ considered  a  DM  zone,_  ·- _ 
given  the  important  role of  Germany,  or  whether  it could  be  seen  as  an  ECU 
zone  in  which  policy coordination  is predominant.  The  third pole manifestly 
lacks  a  widely  held  international  currency. - 2  -
INTERDEPENDENCE  AND  FLOATING 
Without  taking  any  side  in the  fixed  versus  floating  exchange  rate debate, 
I  shall  try to draw  from  the  experience of the  last years  to  emphasize  the 
links  between  policy formulation,  external  signals  and  market  reactions  in 
an  interdependent  world  when  governments  take  account  of this  interdependence 
in differing degrees. 
The  proponents  of  a  floating  exchange  rate  system  were  not  only aiming  at 
improving  the  technical  working  of the  then existing system  by  making  ex-
change  rate  changes  more  timely,  by  bringing  about  a  more  adequate  exchange 
rate  structure,  or  by  introducing  a  greater degree of  exchange  rate or  interest 
rate variability to  take  account  of  larger  capital  mobility.  They  were  also 
advocating greater  independence  for  national  policies.  It  was  claimed  that  ex-
change  rate  flexibility  was  a  way  to  comply  with  what  could be  called the 
"interdependence  constraint". 
During  the  seventies  we  have  thus observed the  interplay of  highly  independent 
national  policies  :  floating  has  not  only strengthened the technical  ability 
of  central  banks  to control  money  supply,  it has  also  made  it possible for 
governements  to  pursue  for  longer  periods of  time  different  national  objectives. 
On  the other  hand,  floating  rates  have  also brought  new  problems,  that  were 
not  all  expected  by  their  proponents,  such  as  J  curve  effects  and  destabilizing 
capital  flows.  Such  problems  have  placed  new  and  unexpected  constraints on  the 
elaboration of national  policies. 
It  seems  to  me  that  three types  of problems  emerge  when  governments,  encouraged 
by  floating,  follow  non-coordinated policies and  thus,  to  a  great  extent,  "Let 
the  rate  find  its own  level".  Ranked  by  decreasing  time  dimension  they  are  the 
structural  and  allocation problems  posed  in the  Long  run,  the  effects of cycli-
cal  divergences  on  exchange  rates  and  trade,  and  the dominance  of monetary  policy 
in the  short  run.  I  will  now  turn to them.  I  shall  not,  indeed,  deal  with  exchange 
rate variability on  a  day  to day  basis at  it seems  to  me  that,  within  limits,  it 
serves  a  useful  role  in  inciting portfolio managers  to prudence. 
LONG  TERM  PROBLEMS 
-
In  the early seventies it was  widely  held that  a  country  could  support  expansionary 
policies by  a  depreciating  exchange  rate.  It was  thought  that, despite  high  infla-
tion,  such a country  could  not  only  sustain its exports  and  hence  its employment 
by  restoring  the  export  industries'  profit margins  through  devaluations,  but  it  \ 
could  also  improve  its industrial  structure as  the profits earned  in  the  export 
sector would  lead to  investment. 3 
For  various  reasons,  however,  the  experience of the seventies  has  not 
supported the  above-mentioned  views  with  as  much  success  as  it  had  been 
predicted.  Firstly,  industrialists are  well  aware  of the  temporary 
nature of the  depreciation of the  real  exchange  rate achieved  when 
inflation rates are  high.  They  refrain therefore  from  investing  their 
profits •.  Secondly,  the depreciating  real  exchange  rate grants,  though  only 
temporarily,  a  new  lease of  life to otherwise obsolescent  industries; 
furthermore,  if investments  are  being  undertaken,  they  may  be  misallocated 
to  industries  that  will  turn  out  to be  non-competitive once  the  exchange 
rate  has  returned to  a  more  normal  level.  In any  event,  investments  in 
industries  whose  profitability is mainly  ensured  by  devaluation  do  not 
contribute  much  to the  rejuvenation of  a  domestic  industry.  Thirdly,  since 
domestic  consumption  is not  cut  back  sufficiently by  such  a  policy,  there 
is  little room  for  exports  and  investments.  Finally,  when  inflation becomes 
unbearable  and  must  be  reversed,  a  "stabilization crisis overshooting" 
occurs  and  false  signals  are once  more  given to  the  markets,  though  in  the 
opposite direction  (see  Chart  II- United  Kingdom). 
In  the  opposite  sense,  continuously appreciating real  rates,  which  were 
celebrated a  few  years  ago  as  the  driving  force  behind  virtuous  circles 
also  may  give  rise to problems. 
MONETARY  POLICY  :  TODAY'S  DEVELOPMENTS 
In  a  situation of  very  high  financial  interdependence,  the ups  and  downs  in 
United  States  interest  and  exchange  rates  confront  the  European  Community 
with  difficult  choices.  It  could eliminate  exchange  rate volatility vis-a-vis 
the dollar  by  pegging  its  interest  rates to  United  States  interest  rates. 
In  this  case the  Community  would  be  guided  by  a  variabl~ the  movements  of 
which  are explicitly disregarded  as  meaningless  by  the  very authorities  who 
determine  them.  Moreover,  both  European  interest  rates and  money  supply 
would  be  determined  by  short  run  domestic  developments  in  the  United  States 
and  by  the  personalities  and  institutions of that  country.  Alternatively, 
the  Community  could  itself adopt  the  United  States procedures  of giving 
absolute priority to quantity-oriented monetary  control;  exchange  rate 
volatility could  then  be  compounded.  Imagine  the  extreme  case  in  which  all 
major  countries  adopted  United  States procedures:  in  these periods  when 
short  term  economic  fluctuations  failed to offset  one  another,  there  would 
be  extreme  exchange  rate volatility.  It seems  highly unlikely that  private 
speculators  would  even  it out.  Thus  we  seem  to 5e  left  with  no  other  choice  J 
than  the  one  we  are  making  in practice,  and  that  consists of  a  mixture  of 
devaluation  and  restrictive policies,  of passivity,  solidarity and  expressions 
of  concern. 
We  must  be  able  to  find  a  way  to subdue  tnese strains  by  an  enhanced  co-
ordination of  our  monetary  policies.  We  have  lost,  as  I  have  illustrated 
above;  the  "dominant  country"  method  of  organizing  international  monetary 
relationships.  We  have  lost  faith  in organizing  the  world  around perfectly 
flexible  exchange  rates.  As  a  consequence  we  must  be  capable of  finding  a 
new  solid principle around  which  to organize  international  monetary matters. 
Just  because  we  have  no  ready  solution,  the  problem  will  not  go  away • 
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The  first  change  which  is  needed  in this  respect  is one  of attitudes. 
There  was  a  period  when  "international  cooperation"  was  in  fashion;  now 
in some  quarters,  the pendulum  has  moved  to  the  extreme  in which  the wise 
maxim  "put  your  own  house  in order first"  is  charicaturized as  meaning  that 
the external  aspects of monetary  policy are not  merely  to  be  ignored  but  are 
indeed  irrelevant.  I  believe that  we  should  be  able to find  a  solution  in 
which  a  recognition of the  consequences  for  trade  relationships of policy 
actions  on  our  partners  is  in  some  way  integrated  in the  process  of  pol~cy 
formulation. 
A change  of attitude is,  however,  not  enough.  It  is  necessary  to  pursue 
some  systematic  improvement  in the  way  monetary  actions  are  coordinated  among 
the  three poles  of  which  I  spoke  before. 
UNITED  STATES MONETARY  POLICY  AS  SEEN  FROM  EUROPE  :  OBJECTIVES 
From  the  abandonment  of  simple  rules  for  international  monetary  coordination, 
such  as  fixed  and  freely  floating  exchange  rates,  one  should certainly not 
draw  the  negative  conclusion that  coordination  is  unnecessary or  automatically 
assured by  ensuring  "domestic  order".  Interdependence  is stiLl  there  and 
would  require  appropriate  action even  among  perfectly stable and  well-managed 
economies,  as  long  as  economic  policies are positively conducted  in  each  of 
them.  Instead of  that  negative  conclusion,  two  positive  conclusions  have  to 
be  drawn  from  the  existing  state of monetary  relationships. 
Firstly,  that  a  much  wider  range  of policies,  objectives,  instruments,  etc. 
have  to be  discussed  in  the  fora  where  officials discuss  problems  stemming 
from  interdependence.  An  exchange  rate  rule  was  a  simple  way,  perhaps  too 
simple  for  our  complex  world,  to summarize  the  Links  between  partners.  Today 
we  have  to  engage  on  the  much  more  complicated  and  politically delicate 
exercise of  discussing  and  comparing  our policies  in all their aspects 
including  some  which  have  a  less  evident  relationship  with  the external  sector, 
like the  techniques  adopted  for  monetary  control. 
Secondly,  to  the extent  to which  the  recognition of  interdependence  involves 
not  only an  exchange  of  information but  also  leads  to action or  to changes 
that  are,  in  substance,  acts  of  international  policy,  then this  is  closer to 
the  "discretionary pole"  of the  rule  vs.  descretion spectrum  than  it would  be 
under  the  simple,  objective  regime  of  an  exchange  rate  rule. 
For  both  these  reasons,  international  policy coordination  has  become  more 
difficult,  not  less  necessary,  than  in the past  and  it requires  that  we  go 
rather  deeply  into each  other's "internal  affairs". 
-·· 
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CONCLUSIONS 
I  shall  try to  summarize  my  remarks  in  a  few  points. 
First, the  world  monetary  and  economic  order  that  prevailed  in  the first  two 
post-war  decades  has  disappeared  in  the  seventies.  The  break  of  the  double, 
fixed  link,  between  gold  and  the dollar,  and  between  the  dollar  and  the other 
currencies, the  emergence  of  a  multicurrency  reserve  system, the  floating  of 
exchange  rates,  the  shift of  the  power  to  fix  energy prices  from  oil  companies 
·to OPEC,  are  all  at  the  same  time  manifestations  and  causes of  the  end  of that 
order.  They  are  interrelated expressions  of  the  same  historical  developments. 
Second,  that order  has  not  been  replaced  by  a  new  one.  Interdependence  being 
as  close  as  before,  and  probably  closer,  an  organization  to grant  "peaceful" 
economic  and  monetary  relationships  is  as  necessary as  it  was  under  the old 
order  provided  by  the  "pax  americana". 
Third,  in  the  existing  world  institutional  setting, problems  stemming  from 
interdependence  can  only  be  dealt  with  by  way  of  bi- and  multilateral  consul-
tations,  in  the  (perhaps  too)  numerous  fora  where  officials and/or politicians 
meet  :  OECD,  IMP,  G-10,  Summits,  etc.  The  assumption  on  which  such  consultations 
are  made  is an  acceptance of  the proposition that  each  member's  policies  have 
effects on  their parteners,  and  that  it may  not  always  be  true that  what  is 
good  for  one  is good  for  the others.  A denial  of this proposition  by  one  of  the 
partners  is a  dangerous  step, particularly  when  none  of  the partners  is suffi-
ciently strong  and  well-behaved to  impose  order  on  the others. 
Fourth,  when  there  are  no  agreed  rules  (like,  in  the past,  fixed  exchange 
rates),  and  severe  stagflation makes  policy  choices politically very  hard, 
consultations  are  a  difficult  and  fragile  instrument  to  deal  with  interdependence. 
In  such  circumstances,  consultations  have  to  touch  upon  a  wide  range  of policy 
objectives,  instruments,  and  techniques. 
Fifth,  if asked  to  speak  out  about  US  policies  in  a  consultation  round,  I 
would  say that  there  is little reason  for  a  European  to disagree either  with 
I 
the  high  priority given to  anti-inflation policy  in the  US  ,  o~ with  the 
importance  given  to the  control  of  monetary  aggregates.  However,  the  choice  of 
techniques  of  monetary  control  unnecessarily  increases  the  strains  imposed  by  a 
tough  monetary  policy both  on  the  economic  system  and  on  the external partners. 
The  relief  comi"ng  from  improved  techniques  would,  however,  be  marginal.  On  the 
other  hand,  an  approach  to  exchange  rate policy  bas~d on  a  rule of  no  intervention 
is  hard  to  accept  for  European  countries.  As  th~ exchange  rate  involves  two  ~ 
currencies, disagreement  in this  area  is particularly undesirable. 
Sixth,  and  last, the  fact  that  there  may  be  only  limited  disagreement  on  US 
policies  means  that  we  recognize  that  these p,alicies  are good  fbr  the  US. 
It does  not  mean  that  they  are  good  for  their partners,  or  that  they  do  not 
hurt.  For  several  European  countries,  in particular, the  level  of  real  interest 
rates necessary· to  keep  their currency  from  depreciating  to  a  level  inconsistent 
with  economic  fundamentals,  is  much  higher  than the  level  required  for  domestic 
reasons. 
. I. - 6-
Thus,  the ball  comes  back  into our  court.  What  can  we  Europeans  do  to get 
out  of this  impasse  ?  Two  things,  I  would  say  :  to  show  that  our  approach 
works  in practice  and  to  be  united.  And,  I  would  add,  these  two  things 
largely  coincide.  That  opens  up  another  field, that  I  shall  not  explore  • here. 
But  to put  in  a  nutshell  what  ought  to  be  said  in this respect,  I  could  find 
no  better  words  than  those  used  by  Anthony  Solomon  less  than three  years  ago 
"If  we  can't  lead the  way,  through  meaningful  policy  coordination  between  . 
the  US  and  Western  Europe,  there  is little reason  to expect  broader  success. 
Understanding  of  each others perspectives  is prerequisite to  bu~lding a 
stronger  relationship.  We  should  acknowledge  and  build on  our  mutual  successes. 
Close  US-European  cooperation  dominates  the  post-war  record.  But  there 
are  also irritants and  sources  of  tension.  The  United  States  continually 
hears  European  calls for  stronger  US  leadership  in  the  economic  area  and 
specifically in the  monetary  area.  Yet  when  the  United  States  does  attempt 
to exercize  leadership,  there  is frequently  a  notable  absence  of  European 
willingness  to  follow.  This  is not  a  recent  phenomenon.  It  is understandable 
if there  are differences of  view  over  the  substance of  such  questions.  There 
inevitably will  be.  The  substance  can  be  debated.  But  Europe "itself  has  and 
should  acknowledge  a  growing  responsibility to exercize  leadership,  not~ only 
in  the expression  of  its view,  but  in  contributing to  the  solution  of  common 
problems.  The  responsibility  cannot  be  one-sided,  and  Europe  collectively  has 
major  potential  for  leadership of its own.  What  is not  constructive  is for 
Europe  to  cloack  its substantive disagreements,  and  avoid  accepting  its own 
responsibilities,  by  resting  on  accusations  of  failure of  US  will  and  leadership. 
Much  of  the  problem  may  well  relate to the particular phase  of  European  efforts 
to  unify through  the  Community,  it is  in  a  unified  Europe  that  real  and 
constructive  leadership  becomes  possible.  But  the present  decision-making 
processes  make  that possibility difficult to  realize.  Hopefully,  this problem 
will  evaporate  as  the unification proeess  evolves  - it is generally  least 
evident  in  the  trade  area,  where  the  European  Community  has  formal  competence  -
but  it does  represent  a  real  impediment  to  meaningful  policy  coordination  on 
a  global  scale". 7
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Table  1:  Some  structural  characteristics of the  world  economy 
1.  EC  and  Japan  GDP 
as X of  US  GOP 
EC-9 
Japan 
2.  Relative  shares  in world 
trade  Cexcl.intra-EC  trade) 
EC-9 
Japan 
USA  C  1) 
3.  Openness  :  imports  of  goods 
and  services as  X of  GOP 
EC -9  (2) 
Japan 
USA 
4.  Productivity  (in  ECU,  at 
current  prices and  exchange 
rates) 
- GNP  per  capita 
•  Japan 
•  USA 
•  EC-9 
- GNP  per  em~loyed person 
•  Japan 
•  USA 
•  EC-9 
- Compensation  per 
salary earner 
•  Japan 
•  USA 
---~ -------~-----
•  EC-9 
Source:  Eurostat 
All  figures  are  rounded. 
(1)  US  :  Fob  +  10  per  cent 
1960 
54 
n.a. 
26 
5 
15. 
12 
4 
n. a  .• 
2,655 
1,105 
n.a. 
6,765 
2,528 
n. a-. 
4,474 
1,640 
1965 
62 
13 
26 
5 
15 
11 
9 
4 
,853: 
3,306 
1,627 
1,631 
1970 
64 
21 
24 
8 
18 
11 
9 
5 
90 
33 
22 
8 
15 
13 
12 
7 
1,937  ' 3,631 
4,685  1  5,761 
2,438  4,290 
3,682  7,242 
102 
43 
24 
9 
18 
14 
13 
10 
6,367 
7,777 
6,735 
8,332  11,107  13,437 
13,119  (3) 
16,330 
3,828  5,903  10,717  16,739 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
n.a  .•  2,434  5,702  I  10,112  c3> 
I 
I  5,351  7,553 
1------ ·------··--·--····--~---- ·---
1  I 
I  2,487  I  3,820 
I  I 
8,986  :  11,095 
- I  -· - -
7,427 I  11,165 
I 
<2>  Excluding  intra-Community  trade  and  services  (estimated) 
(3)  1978 
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Table  2:  Currency  composition of  international  financial  assets 
A.  Currenc~ denomination of  Euro-market  liabilities  <1> 
1973(2)  1974(2) 
I 
1968  1970  1971  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  .1980.  - us  dollar  i 
l 
I 
estimate A 
I  76  73  77  78  79  76  74  72  75 
I 
estimate B  80  78  72  68  71  73  74  70  68  65  69 
Deutsche  mark  .9  11  15  17  15  15  15  17  18  19  16 
Japanese  yen  1  1  1.5  1.5 
B.  Currency  denomination of official  reserves  (3) 
US  dollar  85  84  85  87  85  82  78 
Deutsche  mark  ...  6  7  7  7  8  10  12 
Japanese  yen  .  1  1  1  2  4 
\ 
All  figures  are  rounded. 
(1)  Source  A:  Morgan  Guaranty  Survey;  an  estimate  relating  to non-European  as  well  as  to  European  markets. 
All  other data:  BIS, ,currency  breakdown  of  external positions of  banks  in  the  reporting  European  countries. 
<2>  The  figures  for  official  reserves  refer  to  1973  I  and  1974  II  respectively. 
(3)  IMF,  Annual  Report,  1980 
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